Syria Crusis is become a power struggle of the U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL . It is too early to predict the future of Syria leader .
Proxy wars
The spillover into Lebanon, for example, is no longer a theoretical possibility.
Syria's war is already having an impact on its neighbours, with refugee camps along borders More than 20 people were killed in violent clashes earlier this year between the Alawite minority - the same sect as President Assad in Syria - and the Sunni majority in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli.
Indeed, no other country in the region is likely to feel the impact of the events in Syria more than Lebanon.
The war in Syria has aggravated an already polarised Lebanon between supporters of the Syrian rebels and friends of the Assad regime.
Among the regime's supporters are the Shia Hezbollah group and its powerful militia, whose emergence and survival has, for many decades, depended on vital ties with Damascus and its allies further afield in Iran.
The demise of the Assad regime in Syria does not bode well for either of them, and no-one can predict, with any degree of certainty, how they will respond.
Optimists believe that Hezbollah will not plunge the country into civil war and will resign to reconfiguring itself as a domestic player defending Shia interests inside Lebanon instead of trying to flex its regional muscles.
Traditional sectarian and ethnic loyalties aside, no other political order in the region has tied its fate and future to a network of non-state actors like the Assad regime. These include the fundamentalist Shia Hezbollah group in Lebanon, Palestinian militants in Gaza and the West Bank, Turkish Kurdish separatists and Sunni jihadists in Iraq.
For decades, it has relied on such allies to wage proxy wars in the geopolitical struggle for survival and supremacy.
Iraq is another case in point. Some analysts have noted a possible link between events in Syria and the sudden spike in violence in Iraq.
Although it is possible that Sunni militants in Iraq may have simply felt encouraged to challenge the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that Damascus is, once again, pulling some strings
Proxy wars
The spillover into Lebanon, for example, is no longer a theoretical possibility.
Syria's war is already having an impact on its neighbours, with refugee camps along borders Indeed, no other country in the region is likely to feel the impact of the events in Syria more than Lebanon.
The war in Syria has aggravated an already polarised Lebanon between supporters of the Syrian rebels and friends of the Assad regime.
Among the regime's supporters are the Shia Hezbollah group and its powerful militia, whose emergence and survival has, for many decades, depended on vital ties with Damascus and its allies further afield in Iran.
The demise of the Assad regime in Syria does not bode well for either of them, and no-one can predict, with any degree of certainty, how they will respond.
Optimists believe that Hezbollah will not plunge the country into civil war and will resign to reconfiguring itself as a domestic player defending Shia interests inside Lebanon instead of trying to flex its regional muscles.
Traditional sectarian and ethnic loyalties aside, no other political order in the region has tied its fate and future to a network of non-state actors like the Assad regime. These include the fundamentalist Shia Hezbollah group in Lebanon, Palestinian militants in Gaza and the West Bank, Turkish Kurdish separatists and Sunni jihadists in Iraq.
For decades, it has relied on such allies to wage proxy wars in the geopolitical struggle for survival and supremacy.
Iraq is another case in point. Some analysts have noted a possible link between events in Syria and the sudden spike in violence in Iraq.
Although it is possible that Sunni militants in Iraq may have simply felt encouraged to challenge the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that Damascus is, once again, pulling some strings
No comments:
Post a Comment